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Abstract
A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links
between these positions. Examples of such networks are exchange networks, com-
munication networks, disease transmission networks, control networks etc. For
every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable utility game that
measures the “power” of each coalition of positions in the network. Applying the
Shapley value to this game yields a network power measure, the β-measure, which
reflects the power of the individual positions in the network.
Applying this power distribution method iteratively yields a limit distribution,
which turns out to equal the well-known degree measure. We compare the β-
measure and degree measure by providing characterizations, which differ only in
the normalization that is used.
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21 Introduction
An undirected graph, which consists of a set of positions and a set of links between
pairs of positions, can represent various types of networks. Examples of such symmetric
networks, in which the roles of the two positions on each link are symmetric, are exchange
networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks and control networks.
On the other hand, in asymmetric networks the positions on a link have different roles.
One can think of buyer-seller networks or firm structures. The purpose of this paper is
to measure “power” or “control” of positions in symmetric networks.
For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable utility game
that measures the power of coalitions of positions. Applying the Shapley value (Shapley
(1953)) to this network power game yields the β-measure, which is discussed in van
den Brink and Gilles (2000) and van den Brink and Borm (2002) for asymmetric net-
works. The idea behind the β-measure is that each position in a network has an initial
weight equal to 1, and measuring power is seen as fairly redistributing this weight to
all its neighbours. This measure fits well with power dependence theory as developed by
Emerson (1962) since the power value of a position decreases when its neighbours have
more other neighbours.
Instead of taking initial weights equal to 1, it seems natural to take weights that
already reflect some power of the positions. In this way one obtains weighted β-measures.
Similar as done in Borm, van den Brink and Slikker (2002) for asymmetric networks, we
consider a sequence of weighted β-measures. Starting with the (unweighted) β-measure,
we compute in each step a new weighted β-measure, taking the outcome of the previous
step as input weights. We show that this sequence has a limit, which equals the well-
known degree measure for symmetric networks. This degree measure assigns to every
position just its number of direct neighbours.
At first sight the degree measure only seems to take the direct relations of
a position into account in determining its power value, whereas the β-measure takes
account of (some) indirect relations. Therefore, the degree measure is usually considered
to be a local power measure. However, since the degree measure is the limit of the
sequence of weighted β-measures, it can be seen as a global measure within the context
of power dependence theory.
Besides characterizing the degree measure as the limit of the weighted β-measures,
we provide axiomatic characterizations of the β-measure and degree measure. These
characterizations, which form the main results of this paper, are based on local graph-
3manipulating properties and differ only in the normalization that is used.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly discuss some graph and game
theoretic preliminaries. In Section 3 we introduce network power games and introduce
the β-measure for symmetric networks. We also discuss the sequence of weighted β-
measures and show that its limit equals the degree measure. The characterizations of
the β-measure and degree measure are provided in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we discuss some graph and game theoretic preliminaries. A symmetric
network or undirected graph is a pair (N,G) where N is a finite set of positions or
nodes, and G ⊆ {{i, j}|i, j ∈ N, i 	= j} is a set of symmetric edges or links between
these positions. So, we assume the networks to be irreflexive, i.e., (i, i) /∈ G for all
i ∈ N . The collection of all (irreflexive) networks is denoted by G. We often refer to
these just as graphs.
For every graph (N,G) ∈ G and set of positions T ⊆ N , the induced subgraph
(T,G(T )) is given by G(T ) = {{i, j} ∈ G | {i, j} ⊆ T}. A network (N,G) is connected
if for every pair of positions i, j ∈ N there exists a sequence of positions h1, ..., hp such
that h1 = i, hp = j, and {hk, hk+1} ∈ G for all k ∈ {1, ..., p − 1}. A set of positions
T ⊆ N is a component in (N,G) ∈ G if it is a maximally connected subset of N in
(N,G), i.e., if the graph (T,G(T )) is connected and for every i ∈ N \ T the graph
(T ∪ {i}, G(T ∪ {i})) is not connected. If {i, j} ∈ G, then positions i and j are called
neighbours and are incident with the edge {i, j}. By R(N,G)(i) we denote the set of all
neighbours of position i ∈ N in network (N,G) by
R(N,G)(i) = {j ∈ N | {i, j} ∈ G}.
For a set of positions S ⊆ N we denote R(N,G)(S) =
⋃
i∈S R(N,G)(i). If R(N,G)(i) = ∅,
then position i is called an isolated position. Position i ∈ N is called a pending position
if |R(N,G)(i)| = 1. We denote the set of isolated positions in network (N,G) by I(N,G)
and the set of pending positions by P (N,G).
Finally, a network power measure for symmetric networks is a mapping p that
assigns to every network (N,G) ∈ G an |N |-dimensional vector p(N,G) ∈ RN . We refer
to this vector as a network power distribution for (N,G). A well-known network power
measure is the degree measure, which assigns to every position in a network the number
4of its neighbours. The degree measure thus is the power measure d given by
di(N,G) = |R(N,G)(i)| for all i ∈ N.
A (finite) cooperative game with transferable utility (or simply TU-game) is a pair (N, v)
with finite set N of players and characteristic function v : 2N → R satisfying v(∅) = 0.
A (single valued) solution for TU-games is a function f that assigns to every TU-
game (N, v) an |N |-dimensional vector f(N, v) ∈ RN , representing a distribution of
payoffs to the players. A well-known solution is the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)),
which equally distributes the dividends ∆v(S) (see Harsanyi (1959)) over all players in
coalition S ⊆ N,S 	= ∅:
Shi(N, v) =
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
∆v(S)
|S|
for all i ∈ N, (1)
where ∆v(S) = v(S) if |S| = 1, and recursively ∆v(S) = v(S) −
∑
{TS|T =∅}∆v(T )
for all S ⊆ N, |S| ≥ 2. For every T ⊆ N, T 	= ∅, the unanimity game uT is given
by uT (S) = 1 if T ⊆ S, and uT (S) = 0 otherwise. Every characteristic function
v : 2N → R can be written as a linear combination of unanimity games in a unique way
by v =
∑
{T⊆N |T =∅}∆v(T )uT .
3 Network power games and measures
In order to measure power or control in networks, we assign to every network (N,G) ∈ G
a cooperative game with transferable utility (N, v), whose set of players N corresponds
to the set of positions in the network. In cooperative game theoretic tradition we take a
conservative approach to measuring power of coalitions by assigning to every coalition
of positions S ⊆ N the number of neighbours of S that have no neighbours outside S.
The network power game (N, vG) corresponding to (N,G) ∈ G thus is given by
vG(S) = |{j ∈ R(N,G)(S)|R(N,G)(j) ⊆ S}| for all S ⊆ N.
Note that vG(N) = |N\I(N,G)| for all (N,G) ∈ G. The dividends of vG are given by
∆vG(S) = |{j ∈ N |R(N,G)(j) = S}| for all S ⊆ N,S 	= ∅. (2)
Hence, this game can be decomposed as vG =
∑
i∈R(N,G)(N)
uR(N,G)(i). So, every network
power game is totally positive meaning that it can be expressed as a nonnegative sum
of unanimity games. As a corollary, a network power game is convex meaning that
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) for all S, T ⊆ N .
5The Shapley value of a network power game can be seen as a network power
distribution of the underlying network. The corresponding power measure is called the
β-measure:
β(N,G) = Sh(N, vG) for all (N,G) ∈ G.
Proposition 3.1 For every (N,G) ∈ G we have
βi(N,G) =
∑
j∈R(N,G)(i)
1
|R(N,G)(j)|
for all i ∈ N.
Proof: Using (2), we obtain
βi(N,G) = Shi(N, vG) =
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
∆vG(S)
|S|
=
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
|{j ∈ N |R(N,G)(j) = S}|
|S|
=
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
∑
{j∈N |R(N,G)(j)=S}
1
|R(N,G)(j)|
=
∑
j∈R(N,G)(i)
1
|R(N,G)(j)|
.
The idea behind the β-measure is that every position in a network has an initial weight
equal to 1, and each of its neighbours receives an equal share of this weight. Instead of
taking initial weights equal to 1, it seems natural to take weights that already reflect
the power of the positions. If we take the β-measure as initial weights, we obtain the
second order measure β2. Of course, this second order measure can be used as new input
weights, and so on, yielding higher order measures. Starting with
β0i (N,G) = 1 for all i ∈ N,
we recursively define the measures
βti(N,G) =
∑
j∈R(N,G)(i)
βt−1j (N,G)
|R(N,G)(j)|
for all i ∈ N, t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. (3)
In particular, β1(N,G) = β(N,G). This sequence of measures has a limit, which is
a stationary power distribution. A power distribution p ∈ RN is a stationary power
distribution of (3) if redistributing these weights according to (3) yields the same weights:
pi(N,G) =
∑
j∈R(N,G)(i)
pj(N,G)
|R(N,G)(j)|
for all i ∈ N. (4)
Borm, van den Brink and Slikker (2002) define a sequence similar to (3) for “directed” or
“asymmetric” networks (N,D) with D ⊆ N ×N , and show that it has a limit, which is
6also a stationary distribution. Defining for every undirected network (N,G) ∈ G the cor-
responding directed network (N,D(G)) with D(G) = {(i, j) ∈ N ×N | {i, j} ∈ G}, the
existence of a stationary distribution of (3) can be shown in a similar way as their result.
Moreover, since for every (N,G) ∈ G and i ∈ N we have that
∑
j∈R(N,G)(i)
dj(N,G)
|R(N,G)(j)|
=∑
j∈R(N,G)(i)
|R(N,G)(j)|
|R(N,G)(j)|
= |R(N,G)(i)| = di(N,G), the degree measure yields a stationary
power distribution of (3). In case the network (N,G) is connected, the corresponding
directed network (N,D(G)) is strongly connected1, and it follows from standard re-
sults on such networks (see, e.g., Berger (1993)) that (3) has a unique stationary power
distribution2.
Proposition 3.2 For every (N,G) ∈ G the sequence defined by (3) has a limit, which
is equal to the degree measure of (N,G). This limit is a stationary power distribution of
(N,G). Moreover, if the network (N,G) is connected, then this is the unique stationary
power distribution.
4 Characterizations
In this section we provide characterizations of the β-measure and the degree measure.
The first property is a normalization determining the total value of “power” to be
distributed. Since we want to measure how well positions in a network are connected
with other positions, we normalize power such that the total weight that is distributed
over the positions in a network is equal to the number of non-isolated positions. Since
this boils down to efficiency of a solution for the corresponding network power game, we
refer to this property as efficiency.
Efficiency: For every (N,G) ∈ G it holds that
∑
i∈N pi(N,G) = |N \ I(N,G)|.
The second property is anonymity, which says that two similar positions in a network
have the same power value. For a network (N,G) ∈ G and permutation π : N → N , we
define the permuted network (N, πG) ∈ G by {π(i), π(j)} ∈ πG if and only if {i, j} ∈ G.
Anonymity: For every (N,G) ∈ G and permutation π : N → N it holds that
pi(N,G) = pπ(i)(N, πG) for all i ∈ N .
1A directed graph (N,D) is strongly connected if for each pair of positions i, j ∈ N , i 	= j there is a
sequence of nodes i1, . . . , ip such that i1 = i, ip = j and (ik, ik+1) ∈ D for all k ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1}.
2If the network is not connected then it can be shown that in every stationary power distribution the
power in every component is distributed proportional to the degrees of the nodes in that component.
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position never exceeds the number of its neighbours, and is at least equal to the number
of its neighbours that have no other neighbours.
Reasonability: For every (N,G) ∈ G and i ∈ N it holds that |{j ∈ R(N,G)(i)|R(N,G)(j) =
{i}}| ≤ pi(N,G) ≤ |R(N,G)(i)|.
The next three properties express that power is determined locally in the network. The
first of these states that the power value of a position does not change if we delete or
add relations between positions that do not contain either this position itself or any of
its direct neighbours.
Non-neighbourhood independence: Let (N,G), (N,G′) ∈ G and i ∈ N be such
that R(N,G)(j) = R(N,G′)(j) for all j ∈ {i} ∪R(N,G)(i). Then pi(N,G) = pi(N,G
′).
The fifth property states that cutting an edge into two pieces and putting two new
positions at the two endings does not change the power of the positions that are not
incident with the edge that is cut.
Edge cutting independence: Let (N,G) and (N ′, G′) be such that N ′ = N ∪ {r, s}
with r, s /∈ N , and G′ = (G \ {h, j}) ∪ {{h, r}, {j, s}} for {h, j} ∈ G. Then pi(N,G) =
pi(N
′, G′) for all i ∈ N \ {h, j}.
Finally, the sixth property states that adding a new position to an existing position
changes the power value of each neighbour of the existing position by the same amount.
Pending node addition: Let (N,G) and (N ′, G′) be such that N ′ = N ∪ {g}
with g /∈ N , and G′ = G ∪ {h, g} for some h ∈ N . Then pi(N,G) − pi(N ′, G′) =
pj(N,G)− pj(N ′, G′) for all i, j ∈ R(N,G)(h).
It is readily verified that the β-measure satisfies the six properties introduced above. To
prove uniqueness, we start by showing that the first three properties uniquely determine
the β-measure for star networks. We call a network (N,G) ∈ G a star network if there
exists an h ∈ N with h ∈ {i, j} for all {i, j} ∈ G. We call h a central position in this
star. (Note that in our context a star is not necessarily connected, but there is at most
one component that does not consist of one isolated position.)
Lemma 4.1 If a power measure p on G satisfies efficiency, anonymity and reasonability,
and (N,G) ∈ G is a star, then p(N,G) = β(N,G).
8Proof: Let (N,G) ∈ G be a star with central position h. Reasonability implies that
pi(N,G) = 0 for all i ∈ I(N,G) = N \ ({h}∪R(N,G)(h)), and ph(N,G) = |R(N,G)(h)|. It
then follows from efficiency that
∑
j∈R(N,G)(h)
pj(N,G) = |R(N,G)(h)|+1−|R(N,G)(h)| = 1.
Anonymity then yields pj(N,G) =
1
|R(N,G)(h)|
for all j ∈ R(N,G)(h). Hence, p(N,G) =
β(N,G).
Adding non-neighbourhood independence to these properties uniquely determines the
values for isolated and pending positions in any network.
Lemma 4.2 If a power measure p on G satisfies efficiency, anonymity, reasonability
and non-neighbourhood independence, then pi(N,G) = βi(N,G) for all (N,G) ∈ G and
all i ∈ I(N,G) ∪ P (N,G).
Proof: Let (N,G) ∈ G and let i ∈ N . Define Gi to be the induced subgraph on all
positions at distance at most 2 to i:
Gi = {{h, j} ∈ G | h ∈ R(N,G)(i)}. (5)
If i ∈ P (N,G) ∪ I(N,G), then (N,Gi) is a star network and pi(N,Gi) = βi(N,Gi)
by Lemma 4.1. It then follows from non-neighbourhood independence that pi(N,G) =
pi(N,Gi) = βi(N,Gi) = βi(N,G).
Next we show uniqueness for networks that can be seen as “stars” with two central
positions. We call a network (N,G) ∈ G a double-centered star if there exists an edge
{h, i} ∈ G such that {h, i} ∩ {g, j} 	= ∅ for all {g, j} ∈ G and R(N,G)(h)∩R(N,G)(i) = ∅.
We call h and i the central positions in this double-centered star. Note that a star is a
double-centered star in which (at least) one of the central positions is pending.
Lemma 4.3 If a power measure p on G satisfies efficiency, anonymity, reasonability,
non-neighbourhood independence and pending node addition, and (N,G) ∈ G is a double-
centered star, then p(N,G) = β(N,G).
Proof: Let (N,G) ∈ G be a double-centered star with central positions h and i. If (N,G)
is a star network, then the result follows from Lemma 4.1. Suppose (N,G) is not a star
network. By Lemma 4.2, pj(N,G) = βj(N,G) for all j ∈ I(N,G)∪P (N,G) = N \{h, i}.
Suppose without loss of generality that |R(N,G)(i)| ≥ |R(N,G)(h)|. Define (N ′, G′) such
that N ′ ⊇ N , |N ′ \ N | = |R(N,G)(i)| − |R(N,G)(h)| and G
′ = G ∪ {{h, j}|j ∈ N ′ \ N}
9Lemma 4.2 implies that pj(N
′, G′) = βj(N
′, G′) for all j ∈ N ′ \ {h, i}. Anonymity
implies that ph(N
′, G′) = pi(N
′, G′), and thus with efficiency we have that pi(N
′, G′) =
1
2
(
vG
′
(N ′)−
∑
j∈N ′\{h,i} βj(N
′, G′)
)
= βi(N
′, G′).
Next, pending node addition implies that pi(N
′, G′)− pi(N,G) = pj(N ′, G′)− pj(N,G)
for all j ∈ R(N,G)(h) \ {i}. (Note that such a j exists because (N,G) is not a star
by assumption.) Since pi(N
′, G′), pj(N
′, G′) and pj(N,G) are uniquely determined as
the β outcome, pi(N,G) is uniquely determined as the β outcome βi(N,G). With
efficiency then also ph(N,G) is uniquely determined as the β outcome βh(N,G), and
thus p(N,G) = β(N,G).
The next step is to show uniqueness for acyclic networks. A sequence of positions
i1, . . . , ip with i1 = ip, ik 	= iℓ for all k, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}, and {ik, ik+1} ∈ G for all
k ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}, is called a cycle in (N,G). A network that contains no cycles is
called an acyclic network. Note that a double-centered star is acyclic.
Lemma 4.4 If a power measure p on G satisfies efficiency, anonymity, reasonability,
non-neighbourhood independence and pending node addition, and (N,G) ∈ G is acyclic,
then p(N,G) = β(N,G).
Proof: Let (N,G) ∈ G be acyclic. If (N,G) is a double-centered star network then the
result follows from Lemma 4.3. Suppose (N,G) is not a double-centered star network.
By Lemma 4.2, pi(N,G) = βi(N,G) for all i ∈ I(N,G) ∪ P (N,G).
Let i, j ∈ N \ (I(N,G) ∪ P (N,G)) and define Gi as in (5). Similarly, de-
fine the network (Gi)j = {{h, g} ∈ Gi | h ∈ R(N,Gi)(j)} obtained as in (5) but
for network Gi and position j. Then (Gi)j is a double-centered star, and hence,
pj(N, (Gi)j) = βj(N, (Gi)j) by Lemma 4.3. Non-neighbourhood independence then
implies that pj(N,Gi) = pj(N, (Gi)j) = βj(N, (Gi)j) = βj(N,Gi).
Since for all h ∈ I(N,G) ∪ P (N,G) we have h ∈ I(N,Gi) ∪ P (N,Gi), it follows
from Lemma 4.2 that for all such h, ph(N,Gi) = βh(N,Gi). With efficiency we then
conclude that pi(N,Gi) = v(N)−
∑
j∈N\{i} βj(N,Gi) = βi(N,Gi).
Finally, non-neighbourhood independence implies that pi(N,G) = pi(N,Gi) =
βi(N,Gi) = βi(N,G) and hence, p(N,G) = β(N,G).
Finally, by adding edge cutting independence we can state our characterization of the
β-measure.
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Theorem 4.5 A power measure p on G is equal to the β-measure if and only if it satis-
fies efficiency, anonymity, reasonability, non-neighbourhood independence, edge cutting
independence and pending node addition.
Proof: It is readily verified that the β-measure satisfies the six properties. Now, suppose
that the power measure p on G satisfies the properties, and let (N,G) ∈ G. Let i ∈ N
and again define Gi as in (5).
If Gi is acyclic then pi(N,Gi) = βi(N,Gi) by Lemma 4.4, and from non-
neighbourhood independence we conclude that pi(N,G) = βi(N,G). Otherwise, (N,Gi)
has at least one cycle, and each cycle has at least one edge {h, j} not containing i. Delete
such an edge, add two positions r, s /∈ N and add the edges {h, r} and {j, s} (i.e., con-
sider the network (N ∪ {r, s}, (G \ {{h, j}}) ∪ {{h, r}, {j, s}}). Repeat this procedure
until all cycles have been cut.
Clearly, this procedure ends in a finite number of steps with the resulting network
(N ′, G′) being acyclic. Then pi(N
′, G′) = βi(N
′, G′) by Lemma 4.4. Edge cutting
independence implies that pi(N,Gi) = pi(N
′, G′) = βi(N
′, G′) = βi(N,Gi). With non-
neighbourhood independence it then follows that pi(N,G) = pi(N,Gi) = βi(N,Gi) =
βi(N,G) and hence, p(N,G) = β(N,G).
The degree measure satisfies all properties stated in Theorem 4.5 except efficiency. In-
stead, it satisfies an alternative normalization, which distributes twice the number of
edges in a network.
Degree efficiency: For every (N,G) ∈ G it holds that
∑
i∈N pi(N,G) = 2|G|.
Note that the specific normalization is not essential for proving uniqueness in the proofs
of Theorem 4.5 and the preceding lemmas. So, replacing efficiency by degree efficiency
also yields uniqueness. Since all other properties of Theorem 4.5 are also satisfied by
the degree measure, this yields a characterization of the degree measure.
Theorem 4.6 A power measure p on G is equal to the degree measure if and only if
it satisfies degree efficiency, anonymity, reasonability, non-neighbourhood independence,
edge cutting independence and pending node addition.
5 Concluding remarks
We showed that the degree measure is the limit of a recursive procedure which starts
with the β-measure, and in each step gives as output a new weighted β-measure, taking
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as input weights the weighted β-measure obtained in the previous step. Although the
degree measure usually is considered to be a local measure, we thus have shown that
it can be seen as a global measure within the context of power dependence theory (see
Emerson (1962)). The degree measure also is a stationary power distribution in the
sense that it satisfies (4).
On the other hand, Hendrickx, Borm, van den Brink and Owen (2005) take
an alternative iterative approach. Instead of using weighted β-measures, they consider
weighted Shapley values of the corresponding network power game. For various types of
networks, they compute and interpret a Proper Shapley value as introduced by Vorob’ev
and Liapunov (1998), which assigns to every network power game a particular weighted
Shapley value such that these values are equal to the chosen weights. This yields a
power measure π satisfying
πi(N,G) =
∑
j∈R(N,G)(i)
πi(N,G)∑
h∈R(N,G)(j)
πh(N,G)
for all i ∈ N. (6)
In defining the conservative network power game we followed the game theoretic tradi-
tion to assign to every coalition the minimal power they can guarantee themselves. By
definition, the dual game (N, v∗) of a TU-game (N, v) is given by v∗(S) = v(N)−v(N\S).
It is easily verified that the dual game of the conservative network power game corre-
sponding to (N,G) ∈ G assigns to every coalition of positions S ⊆ N the total number of
neighbours of S, and thus takes an optimistic approach to network power measurement.
Since the Shapley value of a TU-game coincides with the Shapley value of its dual game,
the β-measure also is equal to the Shapley value of this dual (optimistic) network power
game3. Moreover, linearity of the Shapley value implies that the β-measure equals the
Shapley value of every convex combination of the conservative- and optimistic network
power game.
Finally, we remark that the β-measure can be trivially extended to symmetric networks
in which loops are allowed. On this class of graphs, the β-measure is characterized
by the six properties of Theorem 4.5 and a property which states that the power of a
position does not change if an adjacent loop is cut and replaced with a link to a copy
of the original network.
3Since v∗G({i}) = |R(N,G)(i)| = di(N,G), the optimistic network power game generalizes the degree
measure. So, the Shapley value of the game that assigns to every coalition of positions its degree is
equal to the β-measure.
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